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Activating benefit claimants of working 
age in the U.K. 
Simon Rahilly  
The main aim of this chapter is to review the work activation requirements within 
benefits for people of working age who are either unemployed or sick (and in re-
ceipt of benefits such as jobseeker’s allowance or incapacity benefit). In the case of 
unemployed claimants, conditions which are designed to ensure that benefit claim-
ants take active steps to find work have been in place for some time. These have 
more recently been extended with the introduction of education, training and em-
ployment programmes within several “New Deal” schemes. Conditions which will 
require claimants who are sick or disabled to show that they are taking steps to im-
prove their chances of a return to work are about to be introduced nationally fol-
lowing initial pilot “pathways to work” projects. Many of these work activation 
provisions are supported by sanctions and therefore have the potential to further in-
tensify the poverty of the benefit claimant.  
One of the central difficulties within U.K. social security is its “all or nothing” 
nature- claimants are either considered to be unemployed or in work. Alternatively, 
they are either incapable of work or they are capable. This makes it difficult to al-
low for part time work as a part of an activation policy. The chapter will conclude 
with a brief consideration of the provisions which allow for part-time work, work 
trials, “therapeutic work” etc. and of incentives introduced to ease the transition 
from benefit to work and to “make work pay”. 
Introduction 
Until recently activation policies within UK social security have been limited in 
scope and extent. Whilst unemployed claimants have always been required to be 
available for work, it is only in the last decade or so that the labour market condi-
tions required of this group have been considerably extended. Benefit conditions 
are now also being progressively introduced for other claimants of working age. 
This can be seen as part of a project to move towards a more common earnings re-
placement benefit for all claimants of working age, which incorporates a degree of 
labour market conditionality. This chapter will review these conditions for the most 
significant earnings replacement benefits for claimants of working age- the unem-
ployed, those who are incapable of work because of sickness or disability and car-
ers. 




This project to extend labour market conditionality must be seen as a part of 
two other agendas. Firstly, there is the commitment to reduce child poverty and 
tackle social exclusion. Neighbourhood statistics demonstrate the close correlation 
between poverty and deprivation and numbers of social security benefit claimants 
(DWP, 2006,a)1 and the key policy instrument to tackle poverty is to move people 
from benefits to employment, from “welfare to work”.  
Secondly, demographic changes have resulted in a decline in the proportion of 
the population in paid work which has caused concern as to the sustainability of 
pension provisions for those no longer in work. As a result the government has 
adopted an aspirational 80% employment rate for those of working age. This can 
only be achieved by extending the welfare to work agenda to people who have tra-
ditionally been considered to be outside the labour market, such as lone parents and 
those who have been classified as incapable of work because of illness or disability. 
The focus of concern has moved from unemployment to worklessness (Grover, 
2007) and has been reinforced by the publication of a government commissioned 
review of its Welfare to Work policies (Freud, 2007). Government green papers 
have set targets to reduce the number of people claiming incapacity benefits by 1 
million (DWP, 2006,a) and to reduce the numbers claiming benefits because they 
are lone parents by 300,000 (DWP, 2007,a). One of the key ways in which it hopes 
to realise these targets is by extending benefit conditionality to these groups in 
much the same way as it has required conditions of the unemployed benefit claim-
ant.  
U.K. Benefits for claimants of working age: 
Jobseeker’s allowance (JSA) replaced unemployment benefit as the benefit for un-
employed claimants in 1996.2 JSA was intended to reinforce the link between bene-
fit entitlement and the search for work and thereby improve the supply of labour to 
meet the needs of a more flexible and de-regulated labour market. Whilst unem-
ployed claimants have always been required to be available for work and to seek 
and accept any reasonable opportunity of work, the introduction of JSA was in-
tended to represent a step change in these requirements. This intention was exem-
plified in the choice of name for the new benefit for the unemployed.  
Incapacity benefit (IB) is a contributory benefit for those people incapable of 
work because of sickness or disability. Its origins can be traced back to the sickness 
benefits first introduced by Part I of the National Insurance Act 1911. It is a work 
related benefit and can be compared and contrasted with benefits paid because of 
extra costs associated with disability (eg attendance allowance and disability living 
allowance), and benefits paid as compensation for loss or injury (such as industrial 
injuries benefits). Entitlement is determined by a medical assessment and by a test 
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of functional ability, now known as the “Personal Capability Assessment” (PCA). 
Those people who are incapable of work but do not satisfy the contribution condi-
tions may be entitled to the means tested income support (IS). At the beginning of 
1996 the government issued a Green Paper (A New Deal for Welfare: Empowering 
People to Work) in which it set out proposals to reform sickness benefits (DWP, 
2006,a). These proposals built upon many of the initiatives within the “Pathways to 
Work” pilot programme that had been introduced within selected geographical ar-
eas in October 2003. Following a period of consultation on its proposals a Bill was 
taken through parliament and this has now been enacted as the Welfare Reform Act 
2007. A new benefit to be called employment and support allowance will replace 
IB and IS for claimants who are incapable of work. For the first twelve weeks, in-
capacity for work will be determined by the claimant’s own doctor, and benefit will 
be paid at the same rate as for JSA. This is to be known as the assessment phase 
and is the period within which a PCA will be completed to determine entitlement to 
the new allowance. There will also be an additional assessment of the claimant’s 
capability to undertake activities designed to improve their capacity to work (see 
Rahilly, 2006).  
The other significant group of working age claimants of earnings replacement 
benefits are those who are caring for children or disabled adults. Lone parents who 
live on their own with dependent children may have an entitlement to IS. Those 
who are caring for someone who is severely disabled can also claim a non-
contributory benefit, carers allowance. Whilst there have been no attempts to make 
benefit for the latter group of carers conditional upon labour market activity, the 
government has been very concerned to encourage lone parents to move from bene-
fit to work. Although the rate of employment amongst lone parents in the U.K. has 
risen to 57% over the past 10 years, it remains amongst the lowest in Europe, and a 
target of a 70% rate of employment has been set (DWP, 2005). 
Labour market conditionality: 
The labour market conditions will be considered under three headings: interviews, 
an agreed plan of action, and work-related activities. 
Interviews 
Unemployed claimants have always been required to “sign on”. This usually entails 
a fortnightly visit to the benefit office (now known as Jobcentre Plus) and a signed 
declaration that they continue to be availability for work and that there has been no 
change of circumstances. There is also an interview to check on the progress that is 
being made in the job search. Additional (“restart”) interviews are arranged after 13 
weeks unemployment, then after 6 months, 12 months and 24 months. Tradition-
ally, conditions have only been attached to the benefit claimant, but mandatory 
work-focused interviews (WFIs) have recently been introduced for partners. Ini-




tially this was just for those claimants with no dependent children, but it is now a 
requirement of all partners. 
WFIs with personal advisers at the JobCentre have also been introduced as an 
additional condition for other benefits. Lone parents have been required to attend 
an interview at the commencement of their claim since April 2001, with further in-
terviews after 6 months and a year. Those who have been on benefit for at least 12 
months and whose youngest child is 14 are required to attend an interview every 13 
weeks. The Green Paper suggested further extensions of these interviews, so that 
they are held at 6 monthly intervals for those with children under 11 and quarterly 
for those whose children are all aged 11 or over (DWP, 2006,a).3 
From April 2000 claimants who are incapable of work have also been required 
to attend an interview with a personal adviser at the start of their claim as an addi-
tional condition of benefit. Additional interviews have been required in the Path-
ways to Work areas for all new claimants. The first interview is arranged after eight 
weeks on benefit and there are then a further five follow up interviews at monthly 
intervals. 
Agreed work plan 
Since 1996, unemployed claimants have been required to sign up to an agreed job-
seeker’s agreement. This is discussed at the initial interview and sets out the hours 
that the claimant is available for work, and any restrictions as to the work that the 
claimant is prepared to do (the claimant must be able to show there is still a reason-
able prospect of work notwithstanding any restrictions) together with any steps to 
be taken to help improve the chances of finding work. A jobseeker’s direction can 
be issued to require a claimant to undertake specified activities to improve their job 
prospects.4 The government has announced its intention to reduce from 6 to 3 
months the period before which unemployed claimants are expected to broaden 
their job search (DWP, 2007,a). 
Similar requirements for a plan of action are now to be introduced for claimants 
who are incapable of work. For the majority, information about their capacity to 
undertake work-related activities will be fed into a personal action plan (PAP) 
which will need to be agreed by the claimant and their personal adviser at the Job-
Centre. Payment of an additional employment support component within their 
benefit will then be conditional on the claimant undertaking agreed job related ac-
tivities. 
Whilst work related activity has been voluntary for lone parents, the govern-
ment has introduced a financial incentive by way of a work related activity pre-
mium within their benefit. This is to last for a period of 6 months and be paid in re-
turn for claimants undertaking an agreed plan of action including work tasters, im-
proving their employability and job-search assistance. The intention now is to pro-
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gressively migrate lone parents from IS to JSA, with all the associated job-seeking 
conditions (DWP, 2007,a). 
Steps to improve the chances of work 
The Social Security Act 1989 amended the requirement that unemployed claimants 
should be “genuinely seeking work” to require them to be “actively seeking work”. 
This is defined within the Jobseeker’s Act 1995 as taking such steps as can rea-
sonably be expected to provide the best prospects of obtaining work.5 This might 
include activities such as making job applications, registering with an employment 
agency, drawing up a C.V. etc. When elected in 1997 the Labour government in-
troduced the New Deal employment programmes. These were first introduced as 
compulsory programmes for claimants under the age of 25 who had been unem-
ployed for 6 months and was then extended to claimants aged between 26 and 49 
who have been unemployed for more than a year. These claimants are given em-
ployment counselling and guidance for a “gateway” period. The aim is to help 
tackle any personal barriers to work that the claimant may have. After this period 
claimants must choose from one of four options, firstly, six months work in the pri-
vate sector (with subsidies paid to employers), secondly, six months voluntary 
work, thirdly, six months work with the Environmental Task Force or, fourthly, a 
full time education or training programme for up to twelve months.  
Other versions of the New Deal have since been introduced on a voluntary basis 
for other claimants of working age. In 1997 the New Deal for Lone Parents was in-
troduced as a pilot programme for lone parents whose youngest child is over the 
age of 5, and was extended to the whole country in 1998. The government claims 
that 750,000 lone parents have voluntarily signed up for this New Deal programme 
and that about half have been helped into work (DWP, 2006,a).6 The New Deal for 
Disabled People (NDDP) is also voluntary and was first introduced on a pilot basis 
in 1998. It also incorporates a personal adviser service and a range of work 
schemes with a national network of job brokers who are paid by their results in 
helping clients into work. About a third of the NDDP participants are on IB be-
cause of their mental health and another third because of musculo-skeletal difficul-
ties and initial evaluations have shown some success in terms of claimants moving 
into sustained work (Adelman et al, 2004). Finally, in 2000, the government intro-
duced a further New Deal programme for claimants over the age of 50. The inten-
tion is to convert what was a voluntary programme into a compulsory one (DWP, 
2006,a). 7 
When IB is replaced by ESA claimants will not only be assessed as to their in-
capacity for work, there will be an additional assessment as to their ability to under-
take work related activities which would improve their capacity to work. The pay-
ment of an additional employment and support component will become conditional 
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on the claimant satisfactorily undertaking any activities which have been agreed in 
the personal action plan. Claimants will be able to choose between a range of inter-
ventions designed to help them move from benefit to work. These could include the 
NDDP, voluntary work, training programmes, job-searches with assistance from 
personal advisors from the private and voluntary sectors and “Condition Manage-
ment Programmes” designed to help claimants manage their health condition. 
These might seek to “stabilise” life activities in key areas such as health, finances 
and housing (DWP, 2006,a).8  
The government’s hope is that the introduction of conditions for interviews with 
personal advisers and for work-related activities will convert the benefit into an ac-
tive “instrument of rehabilitation” (Bolderson, 1974), but this might depend upon 
the nature and quality of the advice (Bryson, 2003) and concerns have been raised 
about the adequacy of the resources and the capacity of the department to deliver 
given the context of reduced departmental expenditure and the government’s com-
mitment to reduce jobs within the public sector.9 It is now clear that most of the 
“services” to be provided to help improve the job prospects of incapacity claimants 
will be provided by the private sector. 
Sanctions 
Sanctions within benefits for the unemployed have been used to enforce “industrial 
discipline” for some time.10 They are now being progressively extended to other 
benefits for claimants of working age. Entitlement to JSA ends if a claimant fails to 
sign on or attend an interview unless they can show good cause within 5 days. 
Claimants of other benefits who fail to attend their initial work-focussed interview 
(WFI) without good cause will, similarly, not be entitled to benefit. Failure to at-
tend any subsequent work-focussed interviews without good case will result in a 
benefit reduction until the interview takes place. 11  Research suggests that these 
sanctions have not often been invoked in the Pathways to Work pilots, where 
claimants who fail to attend a WFI are first sent a reminder and, in some cases, a 
home visit is made before the imposition of a sanction which is then lifted as soon 
as the claimant attends an interview (Blyth, 2006). 
A review of the research evidence on WFIs by the Social Security Advisory 
Committee (SSAC) led it to conclude that compulsion and greater intervention 
have not necessarily resulted in better outcomes as far as the move from welfare to 
work is concerned. This is especially true for the “harder-to-help” claimants 
(SSAC, 2006). The early evaluations of the pathways to work pilots for incapacity 
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benefit show that they are having the greatest impact upon those who are motivated 
to return to work, and that others see the interviews as interfering and punitive. It is 
entirely possible that those claimants who are more motivated and able to return to 
work would have done so without any WFIs. 
Claimants who are considered to have voluntarily left their employment without 
just cause, or to have been dismissed because of misconduct are disqualified from 
JSA for a period of up to 26 weeks. A variable sanction period of up to 26 weeks 
can also be imposed when a claimant fails to apply for or accept a job without good 
cause, or where they neglect to avail themselves of a job without good cause. Los-
ing a place on a training or New Deal scheme without good cause, or failing to 
comply with a jobseeker’s direction without good cause, results in a fixed term 
sanction. This is a two week benefit disqualification on the first occasion and a four 
week disqualification on any further occasion within a 12 month period. Whilst a 
claimant is disqualified from JSA they may be entitled to a hardship payment if 
they fall within a number of “vulnerable groups”, or if they can show that they 
would suffer hardship, but these hardship payments are paid at reduced levels com-
pared with JSA. 
When ESA replaces IB, payment of the additional employment and support 
component will be conditional on a personal action plan. Furthermore, it can be 
progressively reduced by “a series of slices”12 if the claimant fails to undertake 
agreed work-related activities. Although there will be no sanction for failing to take 
up work or a New Deal option (as in JSA), there will be a sanction for failing to 
take steps to improve the chances of work. The sanction proposed in this event is a 
reduction in benefit rather the wholesale removal of entitlement (as for JSA).  
The changes being introduced within ESA are derived from the “Pathways to 
Work” pilots, but the evaluation and analysis of these pilot programmes was under-
taken after they had only been running for a very short time. Initial findings indi-
cated a 21% take-up of the voluntary package of work support and an 8% increase 
in off-flow from benefit (Blyth, 2006). The Government was quick to proclaim the 
success of what were voluntary arrangements within the Pathways, but in its Green 
Paper it proposed to make these “choices” compulsory. This had been predicted by 
David Bonner (2000) when discussing earlier reforms to IB made as a result of the 
Welfare Reform and Pensions Act (1999): “If the carrots do not produce the effect 
of encouraging more claimants into work, will a regime of sanctions on the JSA 
model prove too tempting to resist?”.  
Lessons can be learned from similar developments which have taken place in 
Australia, which has already integrated income security and labour market services 
using both private and voluntary sector agencies which are paid on results. Terry 
Carney (2005) found that these agencies tended to use standard contracts with little 
                                           
12 DWP, n.1 above, ch.2, para.87. In his evidence to the Select Committee on Work and Pensions the Secretary of 
State suggested that “at the moment” the intention was only to impose a sanction for failure to attend work-
focused interviews and to prepare an action plan and not for any failure to undertake work-related activities: 
House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee, Incapacity Benefit and Pathways to Work, Third Report, HC 
616-I (Vol.I Report), Session 2005-2006, para.162. 




evidence of negotiation or of personalised plans. The integration of benefit admini-
stration with job search assistance is always liable to result in tensions in the roles 
of the personal adviser who is expected to both enable and to enforce (Bryson, 
2003), and Carney found that there was both a 310% increase in the use of sanc-
tions over a 3 year period and a greater use of discretion, with a reduction in the 
number of decisions being challenged by external review. Perhaps as a result of this 
experience, the government dropped its proposals that would have enabled private 
companies contracted to supply assistance with the return to work to have the 
power to make decisions on benefit entitlement and sanctions. 
Permitted work 
JSA claimants are only allowed to work part time.13 However any income from this 
work is deducted from benefit entitlement apart from a small disregard.14 The effect 
of this rule is to provide practically no financial incentive to undertake part time 
work. For lone parents on IS the rules are similar: work for up to 16 hours is per-
mitted but earnings are taken into account in full apart from a disregard of £20. 
These rules provide a perverse incentive to work “informally”- i.e. outside the tax 
and national insurance system and employment regulation- and not declare any 
earnings. Recent Joseph Rowntree research suggests that claimants do indeed com-
bine benefits with informal work in response to their poverty. The research pro-
vided evidence of the disincentives within the tax and benefit system to take up 
formal work and that it can be easier for people with few skills and qualifications to 
access informal work (Katungi et al, 2006). 
The Government has claimed that up to a million of those people on IB would 
like to work (DWP, 2006,a), but this is another example of benefit rules providing 
perverse incentives: claimants undertaking paid work may no longer be considered 
sufficiently incapable to satisfy the test of entitlement to benefit. Claimants may 
have similar fears about undertaking voluntary work , but whilst entitlement to JSA 
may be compromised by voluntary work if it interferes with the claimant’s avail-
ability for (paid) work, there is no such difficulty within the rules of entitlement to 
IB. Indeed, the government is encouraging volunteering amongst IB claimants in 
the sensible belief that it will be good for them as well as being good for the com-
munity (DWP, 2006,a).15 Benefit rules have allowed for a small amount of paid 
work in recognition of the fact that it may help to improve the claimant’s health, 
although the extent to which paid work is allowed is severely limited to reflect the 
fact that IB is an wages replacement benefit. This has come to be known as “per-
mitted work”. Claimants are able to work for up to sixteen hours per week for earn-
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ings up to a prescribed ceiling,16 and then only for a year.17 After this they are only 
able to work for wages up to a much lower earnings limit.18 It is only those claim-
ants who have been assessed as having more severe health conditions who are al-
lowed to work under medical supervision or in a supported environment for an in-
definite period, but there is a limit to the extent to which their earnings are disre-
garded for benefit purposes.19  
Research suggests little knowledge and understanding of these permitted work 
rules (Dawson et al, 2004). Any improvements in working ability that have been 
gained in the year that claimants can work for up to 16 hours may be lost if they are 
not able to move off benefit and into work and have to give this permitted work up. 
Although part time work may be the best route back into full time work, the rules 
provide only small financial incentives but significant administrative difficulties. 
This is particularly true for those claimants who are incapable of work but are only 
entitled to the means tested IS.20  
Transition to work: incentives 
Claimants are worried that an unsuccessful attempt to undertake paid work may 
then result in a return to benefit at a lower rate.21 JSA claimants who have been on 
benefit for a minimum of 13 weeks have a limited opportunity to return to JSA 
without sanction if the job proves not to be satisfactory. The rules require them to 
have worked in the employment for at least 4 weeks and to leave it before the end 
of the 12th. week.  
Initially, IB is paid at a “lower” rate. This is increased after 6 months and then 
increased again up to its “higher” amount after a year. Any claimant considering a 
return to work may be worried about the possibility of having to return to the initial 
lower rate should they have to reclaim benefit. To address these concerns, linking 
rules were introduced in 1988, but they only applied when claimant returned to 
benefit after less than a year in work. Of the 24,500 claimants who left an incapac-
ity benefit to return to work in 2002/03, 2,700 of them returned to benefit within 
one year, but the rules required them to make a specific application for the linking 
rules to be invoked so that they could be paid benefit at their previous rate.22 Quali-
tative research suggested that these rules were not widely appreciated (Dickens et 
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al, 2004) and from October 2006 the linking became automatic without the need to 
apply and was extended to a period of two years.  
The “unemployment trap” is a more fundamental concern. Government social 
security policy has long sought to ensure that people are better off in work than on 
benefit. One approach is to reduce the levels of benefit payable,23 but the present 
government has been at pains to argue for the need for “security for those who can-
not (work)” and has recognised the need to provide financial security to those with 
health difficulties (DWP, 2006,a).24 Claimants will be no worse off on ESA when it 
is introduced to replace IB, (apart from the initial 12 week assessment period before 
the agreement of the personal action plan).25 The emphasis has rather been upon 
“making work pay” by means of the introduction of a minimum wage and the pay-
ment of in-work benefits to supplement low pay. The recent origins of this ap-
proach in the UK can be traced back to family income supplement which was in-
troduced in 1970 but with a very low take-up. Disability working allowance was 
introduced in 1992 as the first in-work benefit for disabled people. It too had very 
limited success. The government’s initial estimate had been for 50,000 claimants, 
but by 1997 there were only 12,000 (SSAC, 1997). Both have since been replaced 
by tax credits paid by the Inland Revenue. The prototypes (working families tax 
credit and disabled persons tax credit) have now been merged as the working tax 
credit, and whilst it may be true that it is rarely the case that people suffer from the 
unemployment trap, the loss of means tested benefits as income rises means that 
there continues to be a significant poverty trap in which many people in low paid 
work remain only marginally better off than on benefits.  
The availability and affordability of childcare represents one of the key barriers 
to work for lone parents. For the first time, the government has accepted some re-
sponsibility in the provision of childcare and has produced a National Childcare 
Strategy. The Childcare Act 2006 has provided new duties for local authorities to 
ensure that there are sufficient childcare places available in their area. A proportion 
of any costs borne by lone parents for registered childcare up to a ceiling, can be 
paid as a part of working tax credit; whilst the proportion has recently been in-
creased from 70% to 80%, the ceilings have remained at round about £170 for one 
child and £300 for more than one child, with the result that, often, tax credits can 
not fully accommodate childcare costs. There is an additional problem; parents will 
usually want to do what they think is best for their child. Duncan and Edwards 
(1999) have contrasted the “economic rationality” that government welfare to work 
policies assume as the basis of claimant decision making with a “gendered moral 
rationality” that better describes the actual basis of decision making.  
The Pathways to Work pilots introduced additional work incentives (DWP, 
2003).26 Firstly, there was a year long return to work credit of £40 per week for 
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those people coming off incapacity benefits and taking up work for at least sixteen 
hours per week with a gross annual pay of less than £15,000. This credit is disre-
garded for the purposes of assessing entitlement to other benefits. The Green Paper 
proposed that this return to work credit should be rolled out to other areas (DWP, 
2006,a).27 Secondly, personal advisers in the Pathways areas have been able to pro-
vide financial assistance towards any initial expenses accrued by claimants who 
move into work. The maximum payment was initially £300, but this has been re-
duced to £100. A similar approach has been adopted for lone parents on a pilot ba-
sis. In certain areas they have been paid an additional in-work credit for the first £ 
months of their return to work and the government has suggested that it might ex-
tend this provision (DWP, 2007,a).  
The loss of assistance with housing costs has been recognised as one of the 
most significant barriers to work (Rahilly, 2004). Housing benefit “run on” 
(whereby assistance is continued for 4 weeks when the claimant moves into work) 
was initially introduced for claimants leaving the means tested IS and JSA, and has 
now been extended to claimants leaving IB. 
 
Whilst the overall trend may be towards the progressive introduction of incen-
tives to work, the abolition of the back to work bonus in 2004 bucked the trend. 
This had enabled claimants of means tested benefits who moved from part time 
work to full time work to be paid a lump sum calculated as half of their earnings 
over the previous 12 months which had served to reduce their benefit entitlement. 
Conclusion 
The welfare to work agenda in the U.K. has been advanced by means of a series of 
“pilot” programmes in selected geographical areas. This power to introduce pilots 
and local variations to a national scheme had been introduced with the Jobseeker’s 
Act 1995. Whilst it is now difficult to keep up with all these initiatives, there is 
some evidence of their success. The number of young people claiming benefit be-
cause of unemployment has significantly declined (Finn, 2005), the number of IB 
claimants has been falling for the first time, and the employment rate of lone par-
ents has improved by 12 percentage points to 56.5% since 1997 with a 25% reduc-
tion in the number claiming benefits (DWP, 2007,a). It is of course hard to tell how 
much this is due to changes within the conditions of entitlement to social security 
and how much is due to the influence of external factors on the demand for labour. 
The government’s approach is to concentrate on measures to improve the availabil-
ity and suitability of the supply of labour, but in the absence of any continuing in-
crease in demand there is a real possibility that many of the measures become a 
meaningless bureaucratic exercise. As Trevor Buck (1996) wrote of earlier meas-
ures: “there may develop a commonality of interest between the front line decision-
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makers and the majority of claimants to collude in a bureaucratic exercise which 
bears littler relevance to the economic realities of the job market.”. 
Linking rules may reassure those who would otherwise be worried about be-
coming worse off if they can not sustain full time work and need to return from 
work to welfare, but there is also a real concern as to the quality of work that peo-
ple on benefit are being encouraged to take up, and of the possibility that they may 
become trapped in low status, low income employment. The options for education 
for those on benefit are limited to employment related skills training programmes, 
and for many claimants full time education ends benefit entitlement. The impor-
tance of employers to the welfare to work agenda is recognised within the 2007 
Green Paper (DWP, 2007,a), in which the government sets out plans for local em-
ployment partnerships. Employers are to be encouraged to recruit from benefit 
claimants in return for the government’s investment into improving their work 
skills. There is also a recognition of the need to provide in-work training to con-
tinue to improve skill levels and thus aid retention and progression.  
The growing use of sanctions to enforce conditionality runs the risk of exacer-
bating social exclusion rather than tackling it. The evidence suggests that it is those 
who are most vulnerable and who are least “job-ready” who most run the risk of 
sanctions (SSAC, 1997; Dean et al 2003), and that it those people who are already 
motivated to work who most benefit from the work-focussed interviews and choice 
options. More could be done to reduce the barriers to work. Notwithstanding the 
adoption of a national child-care strategy and the incorporation of assistance with 
the cost of childcare within Working Tax Credit, inadequate child-care provision 
remains a real barrier. The Disability Discrimination Acts have so far done little to 
reduce the discrimination suffered by disabled people in employment. 
Over thirty years ago Helen Bolderson (1974) was arguing that an earnings re-
placement benefit (for incapacity) placed “obstacles to rehabilitation and fosters no-
tions of malingering and exploitation”. The increased provision of skills training, 
work-seeking assistance and health management programmes etc. may improve the 
employability of benefit claimants, but claimants may continue to fear that the steps 
that they are required to take to “improve the prospects of work” or to “actively 
seek work” may be taken as evidence of either their capacity for work, or of their 
non-availability for work. The government is of the view that there should “no 
longer be an automatic assumption that just because someone has a health condition 
or is disabled that they are incapable of doing any kind of work” (DWP, 2006,a).28 
Work experience may well be the most significant factor in improving the employ-
ability of claimants, but the fundamental difficulty with earnings replacement bene-
fits remains their inability to promote part time work as a step on the welfare to 
work journey. This is particularly true of those income based benefits that are 
means tested. In addition there is a significant administrative difficulty presented by 
the requirement to report any change of circumstances, so that benefit entitlement 
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can be adjusted accordingly. This does not fit well with the demands of a flexible 
labour market. 
The most obvious way to make benefits more compatible with part time work is 
to significantly increase the disregard of income for benefit purposes. In-work 
benefits for those considered to be in full time work, together with short term 
measures to ease the initial move into work, may make the case on paper that (full 
time) “work pays”, but the financial difference is often marginal. Increasing the dis-
regard applied to income from part time work would, in turn, require additional 
support to be provided to those in full time work to maintain any financial incentive 
to move to full time work. Whilst these changes would add significant costs to the 
social security bill, they could be significantly offset by helping to remove of one 
of the main reasons for the existence of an informal economy.  
The government has proclaimed the success of many of its welfare to work ini-
tiatives, but even with the move to convert what have been largely voluntary oppor-
tunities into conditions enforced by sanctions, it is most unlikely that they will 
achieve the targets that have been set. The main way in which the government is 
likely to be able to reduce the numbers of people claiming incapacity benefits is by 
introducing a new operational definition of incapacity through its amendments to 
the PCA. Thinking here has been heavily influenced by the American insurance in-
dustry, which has itself been developing a “claims management” response to the 
increasing number of claims. Incapacity is seen as a growing social and cultural 
phenomenon which can be distinguished from disease. The most significant growth 
in claims has been because of mental health factors and there is to be a new as-
sessment of mental health for the purposes of entitlement to ESA, drawing upon the 
work of a Technical Working Group which was advised by representatives of the 
American insurance company UNUM (DWP, 2006b and DWP 2007b). The likeli-
hood is that this will result in what Deborah Mallett (2003) has referred to as a 
“sharpening” of the test of medical conditionality, with significant numbers unable 
to claim ESA and having to claim JSA instead.  
Similarly, with lone parents the target is to reduce the number claiming benefits 
by 300,000. At present the benefit claimed is IS, which has none of the work-
seeking requirements of JSA. However, from October 2008 and in line with the 
recommendations of the Freud report (2007), lone parents whose youngest child 
has reached the age of 12 will be required to claim JSA instead of IS, and this age 
will be reduced to 7 years from 2010 (DWP, 2007,a).29 In both cases the govern-
ment’s policy intention is to increase the conditionality attached to groups who 
have not traditionally been considered to be unemployed for benefit purposes. 
These developments are consistent with the Green Paper’s vision for a “single 
gateway to financial and back-to-work support for all claimants” (DWP, 2006,a),30 
and represent a move towards a common earnings replacement benefit for all those 
of working age who are not in full time work (Smith, 1999) in which there will be a 
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blurring of the distinction between benefits for the unemployed and for those previ-
ously considered unable to of work. In the meantime the aim seems to be to make 
all claimants of working age subject to work-related conditions which need to be 
agreed in action plans after compulsory interviews with personal advisers.  
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